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Abstract—The industry has recognized the risk of cyber-
attacks targeting to the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI).
A potential adversary can modify or inject malicious data,
and can perform security attacks over an insecure network.
Also, the network operators at intermediate devices can reveal
private information, such as the identity of the individual home
and metering data units, to the third-party. Existing schemes
generate large overheads and also do not ensure the secure
delivery of correct and accurate metering data to all AMI entities,
including data concentrator at the utility and the billing center.
In this paper, we propose a secure and privacy-preserving data
aggregation scheme based on additive homomorphic encryption
and proxy re-encryption operations in the Paillier cryptosystem.
The scheme can aggregate metering data without revealing
the actual individual information (identity and energy usage)
to intermediate entities or to any third-party, hence, resolves
identity and related data theft attacks. Moreover, we propose a
scalable algorithm to detect malicious metering data injected by
the adversary. The proposed scheme protects the system against
man-in-the-middle, replay, and impersonation attacks, and also
maintains message integrity and undeniability. Our performance
analysis shows that the scheme generates manageable compu-
tation, communication, and storage overheads and has efficient
execution time suitable for AMI networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Smart Grid (SG) is a next-generation power system with
intelligent electricity generation, transmission, and distribution
[1]. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) network has two-
way communication with the Smart Meter (SM), Aggregator
(AG) with Gateway (GW), Communication Server (CS), Data
Concentrator Unit (DCU) at the utility, and Billing Center
(BC). The smart meters in the AMI network periodically
send metering data to the the DCU through aggregators. As
illustrated in Figure 1, the metering data from a group of smart
meters collected by an aggregator is forwarded to the operator
at the control center to take necessary actions by monitoring
the DCU.
Delivering secure and privacy-preserving metering data over
the network has become more challenging due to potential
cyber-attacks and weak network security [2]. An adversary
can inject or modify data over the network, and can also
trace behavioral patterns of the household owner to whom
the metering data belongs to. The adversary can also modify
individual meter readings or intermediate aggregated results
computed by the aggregators.
The Open Smart Grid Protocol (OSGP), a family of specifi-
cations published by the European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute (ETSI), is used for smart grid applications along
with ISO/IEC 14908 control networking standard. The OSGP
aims to provide reliable and efficient delivery of command
and control information for different smart grid devices, such
as smart meters, direct load control modules, solar panels,
and gateways. Over 4 million OSGP-based smart meters and
devices have already been deployed worldwide [3]. However,
certain weaknesses have been identified in the OSGP protocol,
such as the use of a weak digest function that leaks key
information and several key recovery attacks [4], [5].
A. Research Problem
In this paper, we address the problem of securely delivering
metering data from the smart meters to the utility and the
billing center through intermediate devices, such as aggrega-
tors and the communication server. The existing schemes gen-
erate large overheads and do not secure the communications
between all entities in AMI. These schemes also do not address
the detection of malicious smart metering data, if any, and
its data removal. In addition, if the transmission of metering
data over the network is not secure, the adversary can modify
or inject malicious data, re-send previous meter reading, and
impersonate entities. We also address the privacy problem of
revealing the identity of the individual home and metering
data units, which may occur at the intermediate devices during
periodic data transmission. The network operators operating
intermediate devices can reveal such private information and
Fig. 1: A scenario of home area network in the smart grid.
pass to the third-party for financial benefits. Therefore, we
need a complete secure and privacy-preserved scheme that can
work efficiently and accurately, even when a large number of
smart meters is deployed in AMI.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we present a secure and privacy-preserved
scheme for transmitting the metering data from different
SMs through AGs to the DCU at utility and the BC. Our
scheme, based on the homomorphic encryption and proxy
re-encryption, allows AGs to perform operations over the
encrypted data for different smart grid applications. The details
of our contribution are as follow. The proposed scheme
1) Provides authentication between all AMI network enti-
ties, i.e., SM, AG, CS, BC, and DCU.
2) Provides privacy-preservation while aggregating metering
data from different SMs and makes the aggregated data
available to the DCU at utility. Different from existing
schemes, our scheme also securely transmits individual
metering data to the BC for billing purposes.
3) Protects the system against Man-in-the-Middle (MITM),
replay, and impersonation attacks.
4) Generates low and manageable computation and commu-
nication overheads, maintains data integrity, and uses far
less storage space than what currently deployed smart
meters are equipped with, and has lower execution time
than the existing schemes.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present existing works on aggregating
metering data in the AMI network. F. Li et al. [6], [7]
presented distributed in-network aggregation approaches to
efficiently aggregate smart metering data along a spanning
tree. However, these approaches do not consider authentication
and integrity protection. Efthymiou et al. [8] proposed a
third party escrow mechanism for authenticating anonymous
meter readings. However, aggregators in the scheme do not
perform any operation over the transmitted data. Garcia et
al. [9] proposed a privacy-preserving protocol to aggregate
partial shares of each metering data, but the protocol is
not scalable and does not discuss scheme’s overhead and
efficiency. Rial and Danesiz [10] proposed a privacy preserving
protocol using zero knowledge proof that enables the payment
without revealing electricity consumption information. F. Li
et al. [11] introduced an end-to-end signature scheme that
supports batch verification of the aggregated results. However,
both schemes do not present the scenario of transmitting
aggregated data to the billing center and the utility. H. Li
et al. [12] proposed a demand response scheme to achieve
privacy-preserving demand aggregation and efficient response.
However, the scheme generates a large number of keys as well
as a large overhead. C. Li et al. [13] proposed a dual-functional
aggregation scheme in which each user reports one data and
then multiple statistic values of all users are computed by the
data and control center. However, the scheme does not discuss
the scenario of transmitting data to the billing center.
III. DESIGN GOALS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present our design goals and preliminar-
ies for the proposed scheme.
A. Design Goals
We consider that the DCU and the BC are trusted by all
entities in the network, and it is infeasible for an adversary
to compromise them. The aggregators are honest but curious.
Specifically, we consider the following design goals to be
achieved for security and privacy:
1) Intermediate devices must be authenticated before for-
warding the metering data.
2) The metering data must not be revealed to the interme-
diate devices, such as the AG and the CS. Even if an
adversary can access the messages at the AG or the CS,
it cannot retrieve the actual meter readings.
3) Message integrity must be provided, and generated over-
heads must be low in order to support a large number of
deployed smart meters in AMI.
B. Preliminaries
This section presents a preliminary discussion on bilinear
pairing and homomorphic encryption schemes.
1) Bilinear Pairing: Let G be an additive group and GT be
a multiplicative group on a symmetric pairing function e. Both
groups are of order q, where q is a large prime. Let P be an
arbitrary generator of G. Assume that the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP) is hard in both G and GT .
Definition: A bilinear pairing on (G, GT ) is a map e : G ×
G→ GT that satisfies the following properties:
(a) Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab; ∀ a, b ∈ Z∗q , and ∀
P, Q ∈ G
(b) Non-degeneracy: e(P, P ) 6= 1
(c) Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(P,Q) for ∀P,Q ∈ G.
Here, given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G, and a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , it is easy
to verify whether c = ab mod q. However, it is difficult to
compute abP .
2) Homomorphic Encryption Scheme: In order to perform
addition and multiplication operations over the encrypted data,
a homomorphic encryption is used to compute the aggregated
sum or product of a group of data values. We use a homomor-
phic encryption scheme [14] to perform additive operations,
which we restate for better clarity as follows:
(a) Key generation: Here, the public keys and global param-
eters are generated given a security parameter. Consider
two primes as p and q, and N = pq. Choose a generator
of the group g ∈ Z∗N2 having an order (multiple of N ).
Let λ(N) = lcm(p− 1, q − 1), where lcm(p− 1, q − 1)
represents least common multiple of p − 1 and q − 1.
Then, public and secret keys of the receiver are generated
as PK = (N, g) and SK = (λ(N)), respectively.
(b) Encryption: The sender chooses a message M ∈ ZN and
a random number r ∈ Z∗N2 . Then, the ciphertext C is
computed as
C = E(M) = gMrN mod N2,
where rN is used to generate different ciphertexts, even
when the same message is encrypted more than once.
(c) Decryption: The receiver retrieves the original message
from C to by computing
M = D(C) =
L(Cλ(N) mod N2)
L(gλ(N) mod N2)
mod N,
where input from the set {u < N2|u = 1 mod N} is
given to the function L to compute L(u) = (u − 1)/N .
In additive homomorphism, two different ciphertexts
C1 = E(M1) and C2 = E(M2) are computed from M1,
M2 ∈ ZN by the sender and the sum of the plaintexts
is retrieved by the receiver as D(C1.C2 mod N
2) =
(M1 +M2) mod N .
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose a scheme that unlike the existing
schemes, provides a secure delivery of metering data to the BC
and the DCU using homomorphic and proxy encryptions and
also authenticates each entity involved. We also describe an
algorithm to detect malicious data at the AG.
A. System Architecture
We present a system architecture for secure concentration
in the AMI network. Our system architecture, as shown in
Figure 2, includes SMs, AGs, CS, DCU, and BC. The SMs
are deployed in homes, the AGs are located in the wide area
network between the homes and the DCU along with a CS. The
AMI geographical area is divided into a number of clusters
consisting of homes. Each SM sends its metering data to the
nearest AG, which then transmits metering data to the CS. The
CS processes and further sends the data to the BC and the
Fig. 2: Proposed system architecture in the AMI network.
DCU. The communication network between the SM-AG and
the AG-CS-BC-DCU can be provided using Zigbee/Wi-Fi, and
LTE/WiMAX, respectively.
B. Proposed Scheme
We present our proposed scheme that provides mutual
authentication between different entities in the AMI network,
as shown in Figure 3. Different from existing schemes, the
proposed scheme ensures the secure periodic delivery of
individual metering data to the BC for billing purpose as well
as an aggregated consumed metering data to the DCU for grid
control purpose. We describe our scheme in two parts: scheme
initialization and scheme execution.
1) Scheme Initialization: The initialization of the proposed
scheme consists of keys generation at different entities in the
AMI network. The corresponding secret and public keys (SK
and PK) are generated as follows:
(a) SMi: SKSMi = si ∈ Z
∗
q and PKSMi = g
si , where i = 1,
2, ...n and n is the total number of SM.
(b) AG: SKAG = a ∈ Z
∗
q and PKAG = g
a.
(c) BC: SKBC = b ∈ Z
∗
q and PKBC = g
b.
(d) DCU: SKDCU = d ∈ Z
∗
q and PKDCU = g
d.
(e) CS: SKCS = c ∈ Z
∗
q and PKCS = g
c.
The CS also generates two re-encryption keys as
RKCS→BC = g
b/c ∈ G and RKCS→DCU = g
d/c ∈ G for
the BC and DCU, respectively.
2) Scheme Execution: The scheme execution consists of
computations and communications at different entities in the
AMI network from SMs to DCU and BC.
(a) SM: Each SMi generates encrypted metering data using
an additive homomorphic encryption scheme to allow
addition over the encrypted data (while preserving data
privacy). The scheme uses a public key of the BC and
its private key for individual data retrieval at the BC
(preserving data confidentiality). Consider w = e(g, g)
and ri ∈ N
∗ is a random number. Each SMi sends its
encrypted metering data mi periodically, say 15 minutes,
using the AG’s public key (N, g) along with meter’s
identity IDi by computing
C1i = g
mi rNi mod N
2.
Thereafter, each SMi computes
Mi = mi ⊕ (PKBC)
SKSMi ||IDi = mi ⊕ (g
b)si ||IDi,
C2a = w
ri .Mi,
C2b = (PKAG)
ri = (ga)ri = ga.ri , and
C2i = (C2a , C2b) = (w
ri .Mi, g
a.ri).
Each SMi generates its efficient and short signature
σSMi = H(C1i ||C2i)
SKSMi = H(C1i ||C2i)
si .
Then, each SMi sends (C1i , C2i , T1i , σSMi) to the AG,
where T1i is the timestamp when the SMi sends metering
data.
SM AG CS BC DCU
(1) : C1i ,C2i , T1i , σSMi
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
(2) : C3i , T2, σAG
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
(3) : C3b ,C4a , T3, σCS-BC
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
(4) : C3c ,C4b , T4, σCS-DCU
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
C1i = g
mi rNi mod N
2, C2a = w
ri .Mi, Mi = mi ⊕ (g
b)si ||IDi, C2b = (g
a)ri , C2i = (C2a , C2b) = (w
ri .Mi, g
a.ri),
σSMi = H(C1i ||C2i)
si , C3i = (C3a , C3b , C3c), C3a = g
c.t, C3b = w
t.M , C3c = w
t.MAG, M = M1||M2||M3||...||Mi,
C4a = e(C3a , g
b/c), C4b = e(C3a , g
d/c), σCS−BC = H(C3b ||C4a)
c, σCS−DCU = H(C3c ||C4b)
c, PK = (N, g), SK =
(λ(N)), w = e(g, g), ri ∈ N
∗, mi: metering data.
Fig. 3: Proposed scheme for the AMI network.
(b) AG: Upon receiving the message, the AG first computes
H
′
(C1i ||C2i) and verifies the signatures in a batch as
e(g, σSMi)
?
=
n∏
i=1
e(PKSMi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i))
?
=
n∏
i=1
e(gsi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i))
?
=
n∏
i=1
e(g,H
′
(C1i ||C2i)
si).
Computing only one hash per SM and verifying the
signatures in a batch improve the overall efficiency of the
system. This process ensures the authenticity of each SM
as well as messages integrity. Similarly, the verification
of the signatures at the CS, BC, and DCU can be derived
as will be discussed in the following subsections. If the
verification is successful, the AG collects all the data
received during a specific time interval as
CAG =
n∏
i=1
(C1i)
= gm1+m2+...+mn (r1r2...rn)
N mod N2,
and applies homomorphic decryption using λ(N) key as
MAG = D(CAG)
=
L(C
λ(N)
AG mod N
2)
L(gλ(N) mod N2)
mod N
=
L(g(m1+m2+...+mn)λ(N) mod N2)
L(gλ(N) mod N2)
mod N
= m1 +m2 + ...+mn.
Thereafter, the AG decrypts message Mi using C2i as
C2a/e(C2b , g
1/SKAG) = wri .Mi/e(g
a.ri , g1/a)
= wri .Mi/e(g, g)
ri
= wri .Mi/w
ri = Mi.
Hence, only the legitimate AG can decrypt Mi using one
exponential operation and one pairing operation per SM.
Also, the AG chooses t ∈ Z∗, and computes
C3a = (g
c)t = gc.t,
C3b = w
t.M, and
C3c = w
t.MAG,
where M = M1||M2||M3||...||Mi. Then, the AG
computes σAG = H(C3i)
a and sends (C3i , T2, σAG)
to the CS, where C3i = (C3a , C3b , C3c) and T2 is a
timestamp.
(c) CS: Upon receiving the message, the CS computes
H
′
(C3i) and verifies the signature of AG as
e(g, σAG)
?
= e(PKAG, H
′
(C3i)).
If the verification is successful, the CS computes re-
encryption of data for the BC and the DCU. Re-
encryption performs one exponential and one pairing op-
erations, which remains the system with low computation
overhead. Also, only the BC and the DCU will be able
to retrieve actual data from the messages they receive.
- Re-encryption for the BC with (C3a , C3b):
C4a = e(C3a , g
b/c) = e(gc.t, gb/c) = e(g, g)b.t = wb.t.
The CS computes σCS−BC = H(C3b ||C4a)
c and sends
(C3b , C4a , T3, σCS−BC) to the BC.
- Re-encryption for the DCU with (C3a , C3c):
C4b = e(C3a , g
d/c) = e(gc.t, gd/c) = e(g, g)d.t = wd.t.
The CS computes σCS−DCU = H(C3c ||C4b)
c and sends
(C3c , C4b , T4, σCS−DCU ) to the DCU. T3 and T4 are
timestamps when the data is sent to the BC and the
DCU, respectively.
(d) BC: Upon receiving the message (C3b , C4a , σCS−BC),
the BC computes H
′
(C3b ||C4a) and verifies the signature
of the CS as
e(g, σCS−BC)
?
= e(PKCS , H
′
(C3b ||C4a)).
If the verification is successful, the BC retrieves M by
computing only one exponential operation as
C3b/(C4a)
1/b = wt.M/(w
b.t)1/b = M.
The BC retrieves the public key of IDi, computes
(PKSMi)
SKBC = (gsi)b and retrieves message mi as
mi = Mi ⊕ g
si.b. Then, the BC uses mi and IDi to
generate electricity bills. Hence, intermediate devices,
such as AG and CS cannot extract the actual metering
data.
(e) DCU: Upon receiving message (C3c , C4b , σCS−DCU ),
the DCU computes H
′
(C3c ||C4b) and verifies the sig-
nature of the CS as
e(g, σCS−DCU )
?
= e(PKCS , H
′
(C3c ||C4b)).
If the verification is successful, the DCU computes MAG
by only one exponential operation as
C3c/(C4b)
1/d = wt.MAG/(w
d.t)1/d = MAG.
The DCU uses this aggregated demand (MAG) in making
decisions to balance the overall power supply-demand of
the power.
C. Malicious Smart Metering Data Detection
In a real AMI network scenario, there can be adversaries
that try to steal or alter the transmitted data, or inject malicious
data to the transmitted packets over the network. Hence, it is an
important and required task to detect malicious smart metering
data from the aggregated data at the AG before forwarding the
data further to other entities. In order to detect malicious smart
metering data sent to the AG, we propose an algorithm based
on binary search approach as follows:
Algorithm 1 Malicious Smart Metering Data Detection
Input: The AG receives a set of n-smart metering data as
SMD = {MD1,MD2,MD3, ...,MDn}.
Output: Returns a set of malicious metering data MDi,
otherwise return True.
while (e(g, σSMi) 6=
∏n
i=1 e(PKSMi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i))) do
e(g, σSMi)
?
=
∏dn/2e
i=1 e(PKSMi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i))
e(g, σSMi)
?
=
∏n
i=dn/2e+1 e(PKSMi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i))
if (n == 1 && e(g, σSMi) 6=∏n
i=1 e(PKSMi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i))) then
return SMD = {MDi} and malicious SM = {SMi}.
if (e(g, σSMi) ==
∏n
i=1 e(PKSMi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i))) then
return True.
The proposed algorithm detects malicious data from the
aggregated data by verifying (n == 1 && e(g, σSMi) 6=∏n
i=1 e(PKSMi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i))). If the condition holds, the
algorithm computes SMD = {MDi} and malicious SM =
{SMi}. At the end, this algorithm returns a set of malicious
metering data MDi if any, in log n time. The AG removes the
malicious data from the aggregated data, and then forward the
legitimate and correct data to the other entities.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present security and performance analysis
of the proposed scheme.
A. Security Analysis
This section presents the security properties achieved by the
proposed scheme.
Property 1. The proposed scheme provides mutual authen-
tication between the SMs, AG, CS, DCU and BC.
As presented in Section IV-A, each SMi, AG, and CS
generate and forward their signatures along with the messages
to the AG, and CS, and (BC and DCU), respectively. Upon
receiving the messages, the signature of the sender is always
first verified. The receiving entity proceeds further only if the
verification is successful. Hence, all senders are authenticated
in the flow of information.
Property 2. The proposed scheme provides confidentiality
of the concentrated data from the users to the DCU.
The AG collects encrypted metering data received from
different smart meters and derives aggregated sum of data
MAG = m1 + m2 + ... + mn by performing a decryption.
However, adversary A cannot obtain the sum because it
does not know the private key λ(N). The AG and the CS
compute C3c = w
t.MAG and C4b = w
d.t, respectively,
which are sent to the DCU. Upon receiving the message, the
DCU extracts MAG by computing C3c/(C4b)
1/d. Adversary
A cannot extract MAG, as it does not have d key of the DCU.
Property 3. The proposed scheme provides undeniability of
data sent from the sender to the receiver.
The signatures at the SMi, AG, and CS are generated using
their private keys, i.e., si, a, and c, which are only known
to themselves. Hence, no other entity including the adversary
can generate the actual signatures. Therefore, the SMi, AG,
and CS cannot deny access after the data has been sent to the
AG, CS, and (BC, and DCU), respectively, as the signatures
serve as the undeniable evidence for the sent data.
Property 4. The proposed scheme defeats MITM, replay
and impersonation attacks over the network.
Each SMi sends encrypted metering data to the AG as C1i =
(gmi rNi mod N
2) and C2i = (w
ri .M, ga.ri), where M =
mi ⊕ (PKBC)
SKSMi ||IDi = mi ⊕ (g
b)si ||IDi. Clearly, the
adversary A performing MITM or the legitimate AG cannot
retrieve the original individual message, as they do not know
the private key of the BC. The adversary A cannot alter the
transmitted data over the network, as the hash of each received
message is verified (a part of signature verification). Hence,
the protocol provides prevention against MITM attack.
Each message in the protocol is transmitted with a times-
tamp value. If A resends a previously sent message in the
current session, the receiving entity discards the message, as
it finds the condition does not hold by verifying Treceive ≤
Tsend + Tthreshold, where Treceive, Tsend, and Tthreshold
are the receiving, sending, and threshold timestamp values,
respectively.
If A tries to impersonate a sender’s entity, it will not be
successful as the signature of each sender entity is required
to be verified. The signatures of the SMi, AG, and CS are
verified as e(g, σSMi) =
∏n
i=1 e(PKSMi , H
′
(C1i ||C2i)),
e(g, σAG) = e(PKAG, H
′
(C3i)), e(g, σCS−BC) =
e(PKCS , H
′
(C3b ||C4a)), and e(g, σCS−DCU ) =
e(PKCS , H
′
(C3c ||C4b)), respectively, at the AG, CS,
BC, and DCU. Hence, A cannot successfully perform
impersonation attacks.
Table I shows a comparison of security features with exist-
ing schemes, where our scheme achieves all four features.
B. Performance Analysis
This section presents the performance evaluation of our
scheme in terms of computation, communication, and storage
overheads, and execution time.
1) Computation overhead: In each of the smart metering
concentration rounds, SMs generate their cipher data by per-
forming random numbers generation, exponential and multi-
plication operations in L encryption function, XOR operations
and hash operations, and send their data to the AG. The AG
collects all the encrypted data received from different SMs and
computes a sum of encrypted data using L decryption function.
The AG generates random numbers and performs exponential
and hash operations to forward the individual and concentrated
metering data to the CS. The CS performs re-encryption over
the received data and forwards the data to the BC and the
DCU. Finally, the BC extracts individual metering data and
generates the electricity bill. The DCU retrieves concentrated
metering data and computes demand-supply check for making
decisions in different smart grid applications, such as vehicle-
to-grid, demand-response, load balancing, etc.
Table II summarizes the computations of the proposed
scheme in terms of operations performed at different entities in
the proposed AMI system architecture. Table III shows that the
proposed scheme is more efficient than H. Li’s scheme [12] in
terms of the computation time for key generation and scheme
execution phase. We compared our scheme with H. Li [12],
as it is the only scheme that maintains three features listed in
Table I. However, our scheme also maintains confidential data
delivery at BC in addition to three features supported by [12].
2) Execution Time: We simulate the proposed scheme in
Java on an Intel Core i3-4005U CPU 1.7GHz with Windows7
and 2GB RAM. The generation of a random number, scalar
multiplication, and XOR take 0.69 ms, 0.039 ms, and 0.029
TABLE I: Comparison of Security Features
Scheme Prevention
of
Attacks
Data
Integrity
Privacy-
Preserved
Data Delivery
to DCU
Confidential
Data
Delivery
to BC
F. Li et al. [6] Partial No Yes No
F. Li et al. [7] Yes No Yes No
C. Efthymiou [8] Partial No Partial No
F. Garcia [9] Partial No Yes No
F. Li et al. [11] Yes No Yes No
H. Li et al. [12] Yes Yes Yes No
C. Li’s PDA [13] Partial No Yes No
Our Scheme Yes Yes Yes Yes
TABLE II: Operations Performed by the Proposed Scheme
Operations At SM At AG At CS At BC At DCU
Random Numbers 2n 2 1 1 1
Exponential 7n 5 3 3 2
Multiplication 2n 2n - - -
Pairing - n 3 1 1
XOR n - - n -
Hash n n+1 3 1 1
L Function n 1 - - -
TABLE III: Time Complexity of H. Li et al. [12] and Proposed
Schemes
Module H. Li et al. [12] Our Scheme
Key Gen-
eration
(n+ 1)Trn + (n+ 1)TECmul
+ nThash
(2n+4)Trn+(n+6)Texp
Scheme
Execu-
tion
(3n+1)Trn+(6n+2)TECmul
+ (17n + 1)Thash + 8nTpair
+ 2nTexp + 2nTadd + (3n −
1)Tmul + 2nTenc + 2nTdec +
TL−fun
Trn + (6n + 7)Texp
+4nTmul + (n +
5)Tpair + 2nTxor +
(2n+6)Thash+TL−fun
Trn: time for generating a random number, Texp: time for an exponential
operation, TECmul: elliptic curve point multiplication time, Tmul: time
for a multiplication operation, Tpair : time for a pairing operation, Txor :
time for an XOR, Tadd: time for an addition, Thash: time for a hash
operation, Tenc: encryption time, Tdec: decryption time, and TL−fun:
time to execute a L-function. Here, n is the number of smart meters.
ms, respectively. We implement Java pairing-based cryptogra-
phy (JPBC) library for a pairing operation, which is performed
in 197 ms. Hash function SHA256 takes 4 ms. The exponential
function, elliptic addition, and scalar addition took 2.1, 0.604,
and 0.033 ms, respectively. The average operation times for
100 runs of Bilinear ElGamal homomorphic encryption and
decryption was 3.1 and 8.7 ms, respectively [15]. The RSA
encryption and decryption took 40 and 18 ms, respectively.
Figure 4(a) shows a comparison of the execution times of
our scheme and the scheme in [12] considering the number of
smart meters from 1 to 1000. Our scheme outperforms and has
execution times between 1.27 to 222.3 s, whereas the scheme
in [12] has execution times between 1.78 to 1775.39 s.
3) Storage overhead: A metering data is periodically gener-
ated at each SM and is sent to the AG. In our simulation, we
consider that each plaintext, ciphertext, and SM’s identity 128
bits long. The SM needs a buffer to store the encrypted data for
each time instance and generates (C1i , C2i) data of (128×n,
384×n) bits for n-SMs. The AG stores n-SMs’ data and
requires 128×n bits of memory to keep the periodic instant
data along with storing (C3a , C3b , C3c) data of (128, 256×n,
128) bits. The CS stores (C3a , C3b , C3c) data of (128, 256×n,
128) bits, whereas the BC and the DCU store (C3b , C4a) and
(C3c , C4b) of (256×n, 128) and (128, 128) bits, respectively.
Each entity also requires to store the received and computed
hashes of 64 bits each, except the SM that requires only 64
bits of hash to store. Hence, the total number of bits required
to be stored is 1344 + 1536×n bits (= 168 + 192×n bytes). In
practice, a communication module of a typical SM has 4MB
RAM and 8MB flash memory [16]. The storage overhead of
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Fig. 4: Comparison of execution times and communication
overheads.
our scheme is far below the capability of the current SMs.
4) Communication overhead: The communication overhead
is defined as the total number of bits transmitted over the net-
work during a protocol run. The SMs, AG, and CS generate the
communication overhead of 640×n, 384 + 256×n, and 640
+ 256×n bits, respectively. Hence, the total communication
overhead generated by our scheme is 1024 + 1152×n bits.
Figure 4(b) illustrates a graph for generated overheads when
the number of SMs are 10, 100, 200, 500, 800, and 1000. The
figure shows that our scheme is much efficient than the scheme
in [12], and lowers the overhead by 43.19% to 99.29% when
the number of SMs are 10 and 1000, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a secure and privacy-preserving scheme for
aggregating metering data in the advanced metering infras-
tructure network. The scheme aggregates the sum of metering
data without revealing the actual metering data. Different
from existing schemes, the metering data and the identity
of the smart meter (and household owner) are only revealed
to the billing center for billing purposes, whereas the data
concentrator unit receives the aggregated metering data for
grid control purposes. The scheme achieves low overheads
because of using efficient and short signatures, XOR and
hash operations, as well as transmitting less bits compacted
by pairing and exponential operations. We also presented an
algorithm for detecting malicious metering data that ensures
the delivery of correct and accurate metering data in a secure
manner. The proposed scheme provides security to the system
against man-in-the-middle, replay, and impersonation attacks
as well as from deniability. Time and space analysis shows that
the scheme is efficient and generates manageable overhead,
even when a large number of smart meters are deployed in
the network. Therefore, the proposed scheme is suitable to
use in the metering infrastructure network.
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